A Perception of the Practice of Software Security and Performance Verification by Ribeiro, Victor Vidigal et al.
A Perception of the Practice of Software Security and 
Performance Verification 
 
Victor Vidigal Ribeiro  
Federal University of Rio de Janeiro  
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil 
vidigal@cos.ufrj.br 
Daniela Soares Cruzes 
SINTEF DIGITAL  
Trondheim, Norway 
danielac@sintef.no 
Guilherme Horta Travassos 
Federal University of Rio de Janeiro 
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil 
ght@cos.ufrj.br 
Abstract— Security and performance are critical non-
functional requirements for software systems. Thus, it is crucial 
to include verification activities during software development to 
identify defects related to such requirements, avoiding their 
occurrence after release. Software verification, including testing 
and reviews, encompasses a set of activities that have a purpose 
of analyzing the software searching for defects. Security and 
performance verification are activities that look at defects related 
to these specific quality attributes. Few empirical studies have 
been focused on how is the state of the practice in security and 
performance verification. This paper presents the results of a 
case study performed in the context of Brazilian organizations 
aiming to characterize security and performance verification 
practices. Additionally, it provides a set of conjectures indicating 
recommendations to improve security and performance 
verification activities. 
Keywords—security verification, performance verification, 
security testing, performance testing, case study research 
(keywords) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The popularization and massive use of software systems 
bring benefits to the modern life. However, their broad 
availability increases the concerns regarding some critical 
software quality dimensions that were not in focus for many 
years. Security [1] and performance [2] are examples of such 
dimensions. Security is relevant due to the presence of critical 
and sensitive information manipulated and stored by the 
software systems while performing their tasks. The information 
usually requires high confidence and different levels of 
classification, having entailed a growing interest in accessing it 
to get improper benefits [3][4]. Performance is relevant due to 
the never-ending limitation of computational resources [5].  
Software development organizations usually include 
quality assurance activities throughout the software life-cycle 
to evaluate the software quality, preventing failures after the 
software releases. Software verification [6], including testing 
and reviews, encompasses a set of activities aiming to analyze 
the software looking for defects. Security and performance 
verification are activities that look for defects regarding these 
specific quality perspectives. Different verification practices 
and techniques can be used individually or combined, 
promoting specific benefits and challenges to the verification 
of security and performance [7][8][9][10]. 
Despite the existence of some security and performance 
verification techniques, the software systems still present many 
defects related to these quality properties. For instance, 
performance issues account for a significant fault category in 
specific domains (e.g., telecommunications) [11] and news 
reporting systems attacks are increasingly frequent [12]. Some 
explanations regarding this situation could be (1) the 
inefficiency of used verification techniques, (2) the software 
organizations are not adopting adequate verification 
techniques, or (3) there is a lack of evidence-based verification 
techniques because of the apparent disconnection between 
academy and industry into this context [13]. Furthermore, 
automated attack scripts, the abundance of attack information, 
and global interconnection make it easier attack systems than it 
was before [14]. 
Some works available in the technical literature aim to 
characterize the software verification state of the practice. Most 
of them generically characterize software verification 
[15][16][17], including a family of surveys 
[18][19][20][20][21] and studies regarding verification in the 
context of specific software categories, such as distributed and 
heterogeneous systems [22], android applications [23], and 
safety-critical systems [24]. However, as far as we could 
investigate, few studies specifically discuss the state of the 
practice of security verification and no study relates to 
performance verification. 
Therefore, this work aims to provide and evidence on how 
organizations are performing security and performance 
verification activities and practices in their software projects. 
We present the results of three cases carried out in different 
Brazilian organizations. Additionally, it was possible to 
identify a set of conjectures related to security and performance 
verification based on the analysis of collected information. The 
conjectures serve as the basis for recommendations in security 
and performance verification, confirming findings presented in 
[25][26]. The results from this study will, also, allow to 
identify possible technology gaps and challenges and provide 
feedback to software researchers regarding the alignment of 
their research with real problems [27]. 
Cruzes et al. [25] report the results of a case study 
performed in four software development organizations in 
Austria and Norway. They were concerned about how security 
testing practices have been performed in agile context. Similar 
to our results, they concluded that static code analysis and 
penetration tests (pen tests) are the most activities usually 
performed to evaluate software security. Additionally, they 
provide some recommendations for practitioners and 
researchers towards software testing: the need for more 
precision on the definition of security needs, the improvement 
of developers' security knowledge, and the need for lightweight 
techniques suitable for practical use. From the same research 
group, Oyetoyan et al. [26] present the findings of an action 
research highlighting the developers' perceptions on using 
security static analysis tools, also in Norway. Some of the 
findings are also similar to our results: the high effort to 
configure the tools, the high number of false positives, and 
unknown real tools' capability. There are coherence and 
complementarity between these published recommendations 
and ours, strengthen the confidence in the findings and final set 
of recommendations. 
The next section presents some definitions; Section III 
describes the case study methodology. Section IV presents the 
results grouped by research questions, and the discussions are 
presented as a set of conjectures in Section V. The threats to 
validity are presented in section VI. Finally, Section VII 
presents the conclusions, highlighting essential findings. 
II. BACKGROUND 
Overall, this work follows the concepts defined by ISO-
29119 [28]. However, it is important to contextualize some of 
these concepts due to the lack of consensus about their 
definitions in Software Engineering. Therefore, we highlight 
the most important concepts discussed in this work, intending 
to be concise and with no intention of conceptualizing all 
software verification area (Table I). 
TABLE I. MAIN USED CONCEPTS 
Concept Interpretation 
Verification practice What is performed for supporting 
verification, e.g., unit testing. 
Verification technique How the verification is performed. E.g., 
boundary value to generate test cases 
Definition of done, 
acceptance criteria, or 
stop criteria 
Overlapping concepts. The definition of 
done is used as a criterion to conclude a 
verification activity.  
Automation level When looking at the automation level, we 
need to know if a practice is manually or 
automated performed. 
Asset 
 
The part of the system covered by the 
verification practice, e.g., the source code is 
an asset regarding static code analysis. It is 
not defined as an artifact because the 
verification may target the running system, 
which is not an artifact. 
Vulnerability  Generally used to designate security-related 
issues. In this work, the term defect is used 
since it is more generic and can also be used 
to represent both security and performance 
issues. 
III. METHODOLOGY 
Table II shows the characterization of three different 
Brazilian organizations in which the study was performed. We 
believe that such different organizations profiles strengthen the 
possibility of generalizability of the results. The last column 
represents the type of method used for data collection. 
Observation means that the researcher gathers information 
through face-to-face monitoring of verification team activities. 
On Interview method, the researcher followed a set of pre-
defined questions to gather information and, in the 
questionnaire, a set of printed questions were delivered to the 
respondents. 
TABLE II. ORGANIZATIONS DESCRIPTION 
ID Nature # Employees 
(# Developers) 
# 
Subjects 
Data Collection 
Method 
Org1 Governmental ~10599 
(unknown) 
5 Observation, 
Interview, 
Questionnaire 
Org2 University 
laboratory 
~154 
(~132) 
2 Interview, 
Questionnaire 
Org3 Private ~250 
(~150) 
2 Interview, 
Questionnaire 
Org1 is a large governmental organization that provides 
information technology services to the Brazilian government 
with 10599 employees (most of them are developers). We 
performed observations, interviews, and questionnaires with a 
verification team composed of five employees. The university 
laboratory, identified as Org2, with about 154 employees (132 
are developers), develops technical solutions to the Brazilian 
government, including the development of software. We 
performed interviews and questionnaires with two employees 
that are responsible for security and performance verification. 
The Org3 is a private company with about 250 employees and 
150 developers. The company develops credit card payment 
systems, and we gathered data from two employees through 
interviews and questionnaires. 
A set of artifacts were used to support the study, including 
the case study protocol and a presentation letter aiming to ease 
the contact with the organizations’ representatives (Table III).  
TABLE III.  CASE STUDY INSTRUMENTS DESCRIPTION 
ID Description Objectives 
P1 Case study protocol  The protocol followed by the case study. 
C1 Presentation letter 
A letter used to make the first contact with 
the organizations, characterizing the 
researchers involved and the objectives of 
the study. 
I1 Organization agreement term 
After the organization agrees with the 
research, its representative signs the 
agreement term. It marks the beginning of 
the case study. 
I2 Participant agreement term 
In the first contact with each participant, 
they must sign the consent term to allow us 
to collect and use data. 
I3 Organization characterization 
Data can be gathered from different sources 
as the participants and organization website.  
It was filled in during different moments of 
the case study execution. 
I4 Project characterization 
It supports data collection during 
participants interview and questionnaire. 
I5 Participant characterization 
It supports data collection after participants 
interview through a questionnaire. 
I6 
Verification 
practices 
identification 
Data collected in different stages of case 
study execution. It was gathered from 
observation, interview, and questionnaire. 
I7 
Verification of 
decision-
making factors 
Data collected in different stages of case 
study execution. It was gathered from 
observation, interview, and questionnaire. 
ID Description Objectives 
I8 Participant opinion 
It supports data collection after participants 
interview trhough questionnaire. 
 
IDENTIFICATION OF SECURITY AND PERFORMANCE PRACTICES 
Project ID _____ 
1. What are the practices used to perform security and performance 
verification? 
A. Practice_____________________________________________________  
B. Responsible _________________________________________________ 
C. Technique __________________________________________________ 
D. Asset ______________________________________________________ 
E. Tools ______________________________________________________ 
F. Description 
______________________________________________________________ 
Fig. 1. Verification Practices Extraction Form (I6) 
Additionally, a set of instruments was used to support the 
data collection. The most important instrument (Fig. 1 - I6) 
aims to answer the research questions directly; the other 
instruments aim to formalize the research agreement and 
characterization of organizations and participants. The first 
author of this paper filled the instruments when collecting data 
during observations and interviews. The participants filled out 
the questionnaire when it was used to collect data. 
After collecting data from the three organizations, about 38 
artifacts were filled out (instruments, interviews transcriptions, 
and observation notes). Then, the first author qualitatively 
analyzed them by following a coding process done by the first 
author of this paper. Additionally, the second and third authors 
iteratively revised the generated codes in several meetings 
sections throughout the process. The MAXQDA1 tool was used 
to support the coding process into which all completed 
instruments were imported. 892 excerpts from artifacts were 
grouped in 775 codes.  
Furthermore, during the coding process, it was possible to 
identify categories that do not directly support answering the 
research questions, but it could provide essential findings of 
security and performance verification, complementing the 
study results. Thus, such information was organized into a code 
category classified as Conjectures (Inference formed 
statements without proof or sufficient evidence [29]), 
representing recommendations aiming to improve the benefits 
of security and performance verification activities. 
IV. RESULTS 
This section describes the results of cases carried out in 
three different Brazilian organizations. We followed the 
research questions and the sub-research questions as follows: 
RQ1: Which are the practices used by the organizations to 
support the verification of security and performance? 
 RQ 1.1. What are the standard techniques? 
 RQ 1.2. Which definition of done do they adopt? 
                                                           
1 https://www.maxqda.com/ 
 RQ 1.3. How is the level of automation? 
 RQ 1.4. What are the assets covered? 
The practices (RQ1) used in security and performance 
verification are presented in Fig. 2. The Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 
present the identified techniques (RQ1.1), the definition of the 
done criteria (RQ1.2), automation level (RQ1.3), and assets 
(RQ1.4) related to each verification practices. The practices 
details are also described as follow, grouped by research 
questions. 
A. RQ1: Software Security and Performance Verification 
Practices 
As shown in Fig. 2, static code analysis is performed in two 
ways regarding security, either triggered by a tester analyst or 
embedded in a continuous integration tool (e.g., Jenkins). In 
the first case, the code inspection depends on human action, 
and it is the verification team’s responsibility to perform this 
practice. In the second, the code inspections mandatorily 
happen when the programmer commit the code to the 
repository.  
The penetration testing is performed at the end of the 
software development lifecycle. It is usually performed only 
for critical systems (or a part of them), and the product owner 
defines delivery as critical because an attack could harm the 
organization reputation. Security specialists or the verification 
team are who usually perform the penetration tests. 
Regarding log inspection, we classify it as a verification 
practice when it is used to identify software failures and as a 
debugging practice when it is used to identify software faults 
(failures cause). Further, this classification became comfortable 
because specialists participating in the case study mentioned 
such activity as a verification practice. For instance, one 
interviewee said: “In a project, I participated in, there was one 
IP accessing the system, trying to identify if it was built in PHP 
and Wordpress. So, it was a well-known vulnerability they 
were searching for”. Therefore, the log inspection allows the 
identification of what could be considered a security failure: 
the application was configured to show the technologies used. 
The verification team performs response time test, resource 
consumption, and log inspection. Response time test, which is 
the execution of the software aiming to evaluate the amount of 
time from a request to a response, is performed at the end of a 
development iteration (e.g., a sprint). These practices are not 
used to assess all system scenarios, but the analysts (e.g., 
architecture, business) or the verification team selects some 
system scenarios to be assessed. 
The resource consumption test is also performed at the end 
of a development iteration and uses the same test cases 
regarding response time tests. However, the system scenarios 
evaluated by this practice is a subset of scenarios evaluated by 
the response time test. Log inspection is also used as a practice 
to performance verification, and it is performed aiming to 
identify significant delays from a request to a response. 
B. RQ1.1: Software Security and Performance Techniques 
The security and performance verification practices are 
executed through the use of verification techniques, providing 
a systematic way to build test cases or review procedures, and 
support for the definition of coverage and stop criterion. There 
were different categories of techniques used to evaluate 
security (Fig. 3): tool-based, failure-based, experience-base, 
and ad-hoc.  
On the tool-based practices, the technique is embedded in 
the tool. Failure-based techniques make use of known failures 
(e.g., common vulnerabilities databases), generating test cases 
addressed to identify these faults. In experienced-based 
techniques, the verification team makes use of their own 
experience to generate test cases or perform inspections. When 
ad-hoc, the practice is performed in an aleatory and non-
systematic way. 
The Static Code Analysis is usually performed through a 
tool, meaning that a tool is executed, and the verification 
results are analyzed. An observed issue with the usage of this 
technique is that in many cases, the verification team is usually 
not aware of what the tool is verifying and what are the 
limitations of the tools regarding their fault detection 
capability.  
The Penetration Test is usually performed through a 
failure-based technique, and the test cases are built aiming to 
explore known defects available on common security 
vulnerabilities repositories. Another technique used for the 
penetration test is experience-based in which a security 
specialist knowledge plays the role of a malicious user trying 
to access the system.  
The Log Inspection can be considered an ad-hoc practice 
because the inspection is based on unknown criteria. A security 
specialist performs it. 
Regarding performance practices (Fig. 4), both the 
Response Time Test and Resource Consumption Test use 
techniques based on the tester experience or based on similar 
systems. In the second case, the verification team verifies 
whether the current system can reuse test cases from previous 
systems of the same company. As for security, the performance 
Log Inspection is ad-hoc, and the verification team performs it. 
 
Fig. 2. Identified security and performance verification practices 
 
Fig. 3. Software Security Verification Practice Details 
C. RQ1.2: Software Security and Performance Definition of 
Done Criteria 
The definition of done is the criterion used to define the 
conclusion of verification activities, signalizing that the 
software development can move to the next phase, usually 
delivery. We identified four categories to the definition of 
done, based on fault criticality, team-experience, similar 
system, and ad-hoc. On the definition of done based on fault 
criticality, the faults identified by verification are classified 
regarding their criticality level (e.g., low, medium, and high). 
Verification activities are defined as completed when no more 
defects of a defined criticality level is identified. The static 
code analysis makes use of this criterion. However, the 
minimum criticality level to define code analysis should re-run 
is not correctly defined. One of the participants said: “The 
defects (vulnerabilities) reported by Fortify are classified, by 
the tool, according to the criticality level. So, in some 
situations, we used such criticality level to define what faults 
would be fixed. Thus, the most critical faults were fixed. 
However, there is no a constraint defining what criticality level 
define that faults must be fixed. Such a decision was a cross-
team agreement”.  
When based on team experience, the verification team meet 
and decide whether verification activities should be continued. 
Besides, the verification team may decide to look into a similar 
system to decide when the verification activities should end. 
For instance, in the last similar system, the tests were set as 
concluded after each test ran three times successfully. Thus, the 
current system tests stop after three tests battery. The response 
time makes use of these two kinds of definition of done. 
If the definition of done is ad-hoc, there is no systematic 
way to set the verification as concluded and it is performed 
randomly. The penetration test, log inspection, and resource 
consumption use the ad-hoc definition of done. 
D. RQ1.3: Software Security and Performance Automation 
Level 
The evaluation of automation level classifies the 
verification practice between manually and automated2.  
Static Code Analysis is always automated, the most 
common tools in our case studies were Brakeman and HP 
Fortify SCA. Additionally, Jenkins, Sonar, and Threadfix are 
used as auxiliary tools to orchestrate the execution or to 
visualize results. When using static code analysis tools, 
participants reported that a problem is a large number of false 
positives. 
The Penetration Test practice is performed manually 
(supported by scripts) or by using a support tool; the most 
common tools are Arachni, OWASP Zed Attack Proxy (ZAP), 
XSS ME, SQL Injection ME, Burp Suite, Meta Exploit, 
NMAP, and Whatweb.  
The Response Time and Resource Consumption Tests are 
always automated and make use of similar tools, such as 
JMeter, Postman, BlazeMeter, Goldeneye, HTTPerf, SoapUI, 
CA APM, and tools developed by the own organization. There 
are also auxiliary tools such as Jenkins, spreadsheets. 
The Log Inspection for both security and performance is 
manual. Probably, it indicates a lack of log inspection tools. 
One of the participants informed the performance failures 
identified by performing log inspection might have many false 
positives, because it is not easy to conclude if a detected 
anomaly is a regular user behavior or a system bottleneck: 
“...when looking at logs, if I identify a 10 minutes delay from a 
request to another request, the problem is that I do not know if 
the request took 10 minutes to complete or if the user clicked 
on one option and then clicked on another only 10 minutes 
later”. 
E.  RQ1.4: Software Security and Performance Assets 
The assets covered by security verification practices are 
source code, application server log, the system in execution, 
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http://lens.cos.ufrj.br/nfrwiki/index.php/Verification_tools 
 
Fig. 4. Software Performance Verification Practices Details 
and the environment. Performance verification practices cover 
REST services, the system in execution, database, and 
application server log. It is important to notice that verification 
practices in the case studies do not cover early development 
phases artifacts.  
V. DISCUSSION 
We have produced a set of conjectures that can be seen as 
recommendations that must be considered during security and 
performance verification as a complementary of the results. 
Thus, we discuss the results grouped by these conjectures. The 
next sections present the nine conjectures. 
A. Security and Performance Verification Requires a Suitable 
Environment. 
A suitable environment is essential for verification. The 
execution of verification activities in a non-isolated 
environment is sometimes affected by external influences. 
Besides, inappropriate hardware/server configurations can 
generate a false perception of system behavior. 
In the context of this study, the first conjecture arose from 
the observation that sometimes the security and performance 
verification share the same environment used by other 
activities. For example, in one organization the performance 
tests were executed on the same server used for system user 
acceptance test. In this case, there was a bidirectional 
influence. Thus, the performance tests may jeopardize the user 
acceptance activities, because the simulation of a large number 
of users operating the system causes hardware overloaded. On 
the other hand, when users were using the system for 
acceptance testing, the performance tests presented random 
results (e.g., aleatory response time), because it was not 
possible to know how the users were using the system. 
The local network (or virtual private network) also 
influences the performance testing results. For instance, if the 
machine used to trigger performance tests make use of default 
organization network, the requests and responses may be 
delayed due overload of the network nodes (e.g., routers and 
sweets) that route them to the server the system is running. 
Another issue regarding the verification environment is 
about the difference between the hardware configuration used 
for verification and used in production time. In some cases, the 
hardware used in the production environment is more powerful 
than the hardware used in verification activities, and this may 
result in a false result on system performance. 
When facing unsuitable verification environment, the 
verification team tries to mitigate such issues by, for example, 
executing each test case more than once and at different 
moments, trying to mitigate external influences in the test 
results. One of the participants said: “It is not possible to rely 
on the response time of only one scenario execution, because 
there may be interference that impairs the operation of the 
system. Thus, response time analysis only occurs after the 
scenario has been successfully executed three times”.  
Neto et al. [30] mention the financial unfeasibility of using 
physical machines to compose the verification environment, 
while others works point to virtualization as the most 
appropriate technology for verification environments. 
However, some issues still need to be addressed for the 
practical use of virtualization technology: the number of 
supported virtual machines estimation, limit of the amount of 
virtual machine, test trigger response time is not stable, 
physical machine overload [31][32][33]. 
B. Security and Performance Verification Requires Suitable 
Techniques. 
Performing the verification in an ad-hoc way hinders the 
definition of a criterion to select test cases and to have a 
definition of done. A proper verification technique naturally 
provides these criteria. 
Such conjecture was coined due to a large number of 
practices conducted ad-hoc. For instance, the use of tools 
without precisely knowing what technique is implemented 
generates uncertainties about tool detection capability. 
Additionally, the number of false-positives defects identified 
by security tools can be a problem, if all the defects reported 
should be analyzed, it requires a substantial extra effort. 
In our study, we could not find mitigation actions to these 
problems, but we noticed that the teams are aware that they can 
improve verification activities. 
 Martin and Xie [34] present the results of an experiment 
showing the use of a technique increase the defect detection 
capability and the essential coverage of security verification. 
Furthermore, the use of suitable techniques in different phases 
of the software development (e.g., abuse case in requirements 
and model, misuse cases, threat trees in design) promotes the 
identification of defects in early stages of software 
development [35][36][37][38]. Some researchers also suggest a 
combination of techniques to increase the ability to detect 
different types of defects, such as complementing the 
automated tests with manual reviews [38][39][40]. 
C. The lack of security and performance requirements 
prevents the verification from playing its original purpose. 
The lack of security and performance requirements 
prevents the verification from playing its original purpose (i.e., 
assessing whether the software meets its requirements) because 
in the absence of an oracle it is impossible to know if the 
verification results are correct. Also, inaccurate requirements 
overload other teams (e.g., analysts, architects, developers) 
because the verification team must continuously contact them. 
In the organizations used in this study, sometimes there 
were no written performance requirements that could be used 
as an oracle. In such cases, the verification activities were not 
performed to assess whether the software meets its 
requirements but are to evaluate the capacity of the system. 
Some other times, the verification activities were performed 
based on subjective or imprecise requirements. For example, a 
participant reported a case where the tests were performed 
based on a brief description about users’ behavior: "In this 
system, everyone comes in at 8 in the morning and stays until 
10 o'clock. Then they leave the system and come back at 
lunch". 
In the literature, researchers have identified a set of issues 
and challenges regarding security and performance 
requirements: lack of support tools and techniques, techniques 
are unsuitable to target users, requirements not provided, and 
wrong requirements descriptions. Such issues make 
verification impossible, ambiguous or generic 
[41][42][43][44]. It is also possible to identify a set of 
proposed techniques and recommendations to handle security 
and performance requirements: misuse cases, SETAM 
UMLsec, abuse cases, description of attack patterns 
[35][41][44][45][46][47][48][49][50], indicating a gap between 
practice and academy because despite the existence of 
techniques they are not in use. 
D. Training in Security and Performance Verification 
Improves Verification Activities. 
Some participants reported the challenges in performing 
security and performance verification due to the lack of 
training. One of the participants said: "...security and 
performance tests were performed by a specific specialized 
team. However, the responsibility for testing now belongs to 
the department. In this way, we still feel a bit of difficulty in 
performing security and performance verification". 
The lack of training also results in a misunderstanding of 
security and performance verification concepts, generating 
risks to the verification activities, because team members may 
understand and perform their activities in a contradictory way. 
One way to mitigate the lack of consensus about verification 
concepts was to define a document precisely describing each 
verification activity and its purpose. A participant said: 
"...usually to perform these tests I have to create a document of 
concepts definitions because there were several 
misunderstandings before. There are people who think that 
load testing means to verify the limit of the application and 
there are people who think that it is the stress testing". 
Røstad et al. [51] alert that few universities teach how to 
build secure software, resulting in students graduating without 
seeing safe development. They raise some critical issues 
regarding security training, such as ethics needs to be 
considered and is an educator's responsibility to teach the 
importance of dealing with security in the early phases of 
software development; they also mention the limited capability 
of open sources tools and a high cost of suitable tools. Bondi 
and Ros [52] highlight some issues regarding remote training 
of performance verification, such as the need to be systematic, 
problems with different time zone, and inculcate good 
performance testing practices.  
E. Verification Activities Only do Not Guarantee Software 
Security and Performance Effectiveness. 
Security and performance verification should be 
corroborated with other techniques because they alone do not 
create enough evidence to provide security confidence and 
adequate performance to software systems. In our study, 
participants of different organizations emphasized that 
verification activities not be entirely effective regarding defect 
detection capability. Therefore, it is vital to make use of 
complementary activities to improve software security and 
performance, such as system monitoring and actions to prevent 
the use of social engineering. A participant said: "...there is a 
security monitoring team looking at the production servers. 
When an attack is identified, this team identify the exploited 
vulnerability and notify the development team who provides the 
fix". 
This finding is consistent with the software testing theory 
that states that testing aims to shows presence of defects, but it 
is not able to prove their absence [53]. Additionally, there is 
evidence in the literature that verification security methods do 
not identify all defects [54][55] and some performance tools 
has limitations such as on temporal synchronization, GUI 
elements identification and incomplete implementations [56]. 
F. Security and Performance Verification Requires Cross-
Functional Teams. 
Verification activities are not performed in isolation by 
only one team. It requires interaction between different teams, 
including different skills. In the case studies, there was a need 
for infrastructure, database, and technical teams to work 
together due to the need to configure servers (e.g., allow a 
specific IP to access the server or restart it after catastrophic 
failure), restore database backups and deal with specific low-
level technologies. A participant reported a need to interact 
with an operating systems specialist: "...we have to ask to 
change the (operating system) kernel because it has a limit in 
the size (of requests) that can be sent...". 
A cross-team interaction is also essential to identify the 
technologies used to build the software and how such 
technologies may influence verification results. For example, 
the verification team observes that performance tests of the 
same scenario were resulting in a shortened response time. 
Thus, talking to the development team, they discover the 
system was making use of a CDN (Content Delivery Network) 
cache technology. 
Some papers identify the need for teams with different 
skills in security and performance verification activities and 
propose strategies to encourage the information exchange 
between teams [40][57][58]. A card game named protection 
poker provides security knowledge sharing, involves the entire 
development team, and increase the awareness of software 
security needs. Another recommendation is to take 
programmers as allies, not as enemies. Regarding performance, 
Johnson et al. [58] show how weekly meetings involving 
performance architect, domain experts, marketing stakeholders 
and developers can improve team interactions. 
G. Planning and Environment Configuration of Security and 
Performance Verification Demands Extra Effort. 
In the studied organizations, many of the verification 
activities are automated. Thus, the execution phase does not 
require as much effort as the planning and environment 
configuration. The planning phase demands high effort because 
the team should prioritize the test cases to be executed and 
identify dependencies between scenarios being tested. It 
requires an information exchange between verification and 
development teams.  
The configuration of the environment also requires extra 
effort. A participant reported that the activity requiring the 
most effort is to config the environment so that the system runs 
in a suitable state for testing: “The major problem with 
performance testing is to organize the database with a suitable 
dataset, aiming to run the system under the desired load.”. In 
our study, we cannot find ways to reduce the effort of planning 
verification and environment configuration. 
Chen et al. [59] present the challenges to configure an 
environment: be able to simulate workloads similar to the real 
world, to consider high insertion speed, and to meet BD and 
business logic constraints. 
H. Organizational Support Influences Positively Security and 
Performance Activity. 
This conjecture is about how the organizational perception 
of the importance of security and performance software 
systems properties affects the verification activities. 
Participants reported that organizations generally do not give 
proper attention to system security and performance, 
considering security and performance verification a waste of 
resources. Usually, organizations are inclined to worry about 
the security and performance of their systems only after they 
have a problem. Another situation where organizations invest 
more in security and performance is before a major release in 
which a security or performance failure could negatively affect 
organization image. One of the participants said: "By my own 
experience working in different places, what I see is that 
people only care about testing when a problem happens.". 
Horký et al. [60] report an experiment showing that 
keeping programmers well-informed about performance can 
decrease the number of bad decisions, influencing the system 
performance. Besides, Ferrell et al. [61] emphasize the 
challenge of security awareness: programmers are not concern 
about security because they have a false impression that new 
development technologies are immune to security problems. 
I. Security and Performance Verification Activities are 
Ignored When There Are Limited Resources of Time and 
Budget.  
Security and performance verification activities are ignored 
when there is a reduction in the deadline or budget of the 
development project. It can impact the system quality because 
the product owner may decide to stop the verification before all 
activities are executed, decreasing verification coverage. 
A participant informed the planned tests are reported in the 
final testing report, including the non-performed tests to 
mitigate it. Thus, the customers are aware that the executed 
tests did not the planned coverage, transferring the 
responsibility of the risk to the customer. 
We were not able to find support for this conjecture in the 
technical literature. 
VI. THREATS TO VALIDITY 
We describe the threats to validity following the 
recommendations of Cruzes and Othmane [62] and making use 
of quality criteria (Q1-4) and proposed methods (M1-6) to 
improve them [63][64]. 
The credibility (Q1), representing the quality of being 
convincing or believable, was addressed using rich 
data/persistent observations (M1) and through data collection 
using three methods (observation, interviews, and 
questionnaires), making notes about what happened, and 
verbatim transcripts of what participants said. Furthermore, 
while reporting the results, we provide quotes of the 
participants. 
The transferability (Q2) quality refers to the degree to 
which the results can be generalized to other contexts or 
settings. Such quality is problematic in the case of studies 
because it is not viable to achieve a significant number of 
subjects as it was not in our case. However, to improve the 
transferability, we used the intensive long-term involvement 
(M2) method, performing the research in place, making it 
possible to have a more precise context perception the study is 
characterizing. Thus, it was possible to provide an in-depth 
description of the organizations' characteristics and context in 
which data were collected. 
Regarding dependability (Q3), the data stability and 
reliability over time and conditions, we performed the study in 
different organizations with participants from a variety of 
profiles. Furthermore, one more case was planned, and it is 
already scheduled to be performed. In this way, we can 
triangulate (M3) the results, improving the dependability. 
Additionally, the research protocol is available, making it 
possible the study replication in different contexts. 
To avoid researcher’s bias and improve the confirmability 
(Q4), we use peer debriefing (M4), exposing our main findings 
to a research group and discussing the coherence of them. We 
also promoted iterative meetings among the authors to discuss 
the codes according to creation progress. Additionally, we 
performed a search on the literature to support the coined 
conjectures. 
It is important to mention what mitigated regarding threats 
to validity: due to participants availability restrictions we could 
not use respondent validation (M5) and member checking (M6) 
to confirm what they said and the validity of our conclusions. 
Besides, it is important to mention that the case study was 
carried out in the context of Brazilian organizations, where 
Portuguese is the mother language. Thus, the participants’ 
quotes reproduced here are translations of what was said by 
them. Besides, the artifacts and codes were built in Portuguese 
and translated into English, for the sake of readers’ 
understanding. We believe that the translation does not affect 
the results reported since we did not perform a 
sentiment/feelings analysis of the participants’ answers. 
Finally, investigating two non-functional requirements 
together can be risky. There were situations in which it was not 
possible to determine whether a respondent was reporting 
issues related to security or performance. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
This paper presents the results of a case study performed in 
the context of three Brazilian software organizations. The study 
provides a characterization of the state of the practice of 
security and performance verification activities. Additionally, 
the findings are discussed in the form of conjectures, 
representing recommendations applicable to such activities. In 
general, there is an increasing awareness of the importance of 
security and performance of software systems, and 
consequently, the importance of verification activities. 
However, there is a lack of knowledge about how verification 
should be accomplished. 
The security and performance verification was performed 
on an unsuitable environment. Besides, the use of verification 
techniques is low. For instance, techniques aiming to 
systematize the test case generation or inspection procedure. It 
may result in inefficient test cases (low chance to reveal a 
failure). Such warning is emphasized by the profile of the 
professionals who perform the verification. Usually, they do 
not have suitable experience and training regarding security or 
performance. In addition, we conjecture that the lack of 
requirements or their imprecise specification contributes to the 
ad-hoc definition of done. 
Finally, it was not possible to identify verification activities 
addressed to artifacts related to early stages of the software 
development cycle (e.g., requirements and design diagrams). It 
contradicts the recommendations of established guidelines 
[65][66].  
As future work, we intend to perform a set of rapid reviews 
[66] to increase the confidence regarding the presented 
conjectures. Additionally, we started the replication of the case 
study in another organization, aiming to provide cross-
validation of the current results.  
We believe that the recommendations presented in this 
paper can help practitioners to avoid known problems 
conducting security and performance verification. Besides, it 
can be useful for researchers as they may target their 
investigations to address the raised issues. As future work, we 
intend to propose an approach to help practitioners perform the 
security and performance verification considering the 
conjectures as recommendations. 
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